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A D M I R A LT Y 
What Is the Meaning of a “Safe Berth” Clause in a Charter Party? 
CASE AT A GLANCE  
Ships are leased pursuant to contracts known as “charter parties.” Like most form contracts, charter 
parties contain a great deal of “boilerplate.” In this case, the Supreme Court must decide whether a “safe 
berth” clause guarantees a ship’s safety or merely imposes a duty of care on the lessee (“charterer”). 
 
CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd. 
Docket No. 18-565 
 
Argument Date: November 5, 2019 
From: The Third Circuit 
 
by Robert M. Jarvis 
Nova Southeastern University College of Law, Fort Lauderdale, FL 
INTRODUCTION
Parties that lease ships typically do so on preprinted forms known 
as “charter parties.” Like most commercial contracts, charter 
parties contain numerous boilerplate clauses. One such clause 
is a “safe berth” clause, which requires the lessee (called the 
“charterer”) to send the ship only to docks it can reach safely. 
Such a clause resembles, and often is combined with, a “safe port” 
clause, which requires the charterer to send the ship only to ports 
it can reach safely.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, based in New 
York, views such clauses as guarantees:
[T]he charterer bargains for the privilege of selecting 
the precise place for discharge and the ship surrenders 
that privilege in return for the charterer’s acceptance of 
the risk of its choice.
Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 188 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951). See also Venore Transportation Co. 
v. Oswego Shipping Corp., 498 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 998 (1974); Ore Carriers of Liberia, Inc. v. Navigen Co., 435 
F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1970); Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A., 
310 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 967 (1963).
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, located 
in New Orleans, considers these clauses to be merely promises 
that the charterer will do its best to send the ship to safe locations:
[N]o legitimate legal or social policy is furthered by 
making the charterer warrant the safety of the berth it 
selects. Such a warranty could discourage the master on 
the scene from using his best judgment in determining 
the safety of the berth. Moreover, avoiding strict liability 
does not increase risks because the safe berth clause 
itself gives the master the freedom not to take his vessel 
into an unsafe port.
Orduna S.A. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 913 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1990).  
The same conclusion has been reached by trial courts in the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits. See In re Jubilant Voyager Corp., 
S.A. of Panama, 1983 WL 589 (E.D. Va. 1983); California ex rel. 
Department of Transportation v. S/T Norfolk, 435 F. Supp. 1039 
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
In the present case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
headquartered in Philadelphia, adopted the Second Circuit’s 
position:
We are persuaded that the Second Circuit’s longstanding 
formulation of the safe berth clause is the one we should 
follow….
To the extent the Fifth Circuit in Orduna deviated from 
this well-established standard, we are not persuaded by 
its reasoning and decline to follow the course it charted. 
Hence we conclude that the safe berth warranty is an 
express assurance made without regard to the amount of 
diligence taken by the charterer.
In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citations and footnotes omitted). Thus, it now is up to the U.S. 
Supreme Court to decide whether the Third Circuit made the 
right choice.
ISSUE
Is a “safe berth” clause in a charter party a guarantee, or merely 
a promise, that the charterer will send the owner’s ship to a safe 
dock?
FACTS
On November 26, 2004, the 748-foot Cypriot oil tanker Athos I 
was nearing the end of a 1,900-mile journey from Puerto Miranda, 
Venezuela, to a CITGO refinery in Paulsboro, New Jersey, just 
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across from the Philadelphia International Airport. When it was 
within 900 feet of the dock, however, it struck an abandoned nine- 
ton iron anchor. The allision ripped two holes in the Athos I’s hull 
and caused 200,000 barrels of crude oil to be released into the 
Delaware River.
Following the accident, Randive, Inc., a New Jersey salvage 
company, managed to retrieve the anchor. Despite a formal 
investigation by the U.S. Coast Guard, the anchor’s owner was 
never identified. Likewise, the Coast Guard was unable to say how 
long the anchor had been lying on the river’s bottom. See https://
www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/
docs/documents/AthosI.pdf (at page 38).
At the time of the mishap, the Athos I was owned by Frescati 
Shipping Company, Ltd. (a Cypriot firm) and managed by Tsakos 
Shipping & Trading, S.A. (a Greek company). In 2001, Tsakos had 
“time-chartered” the Athos I into a “tanker pool” assembled by 
Star Tankers, Inc. of Connecticut. Thus, when CITGO needed a 
vessel to carry its oil, it “voyage-chartered” the Athos I from Star.
Frescati ended up paying $143 million to decontaminate the river 
and settle the claims of various third parties (including a nearby 
nuclear power plant that was forced to temporarily shut down). 
Because the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761, 
caps the liability of shipowners, the U.S. government (USG) 
reimbursed Frescati $88 million. This money came from the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is financed by a tax on petroleum 
products.
To recover their respective costs, Frescati and the USG sued 
three CITGO entities (collectively, “CARCO”): CITGO Asphalt 
Refining Company, CITGO East Coast Oil Corporation, and CITGO 
Petroleum Corporation. These claims were consolidated with 
Frescati’s lawsuit seeking exoneration under the Shipowner’s 
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512.
In 2011, following a 41-day nonjury trial, Senior District Judge 
John P. Fullam of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania ruled that CARCO had no liability, either in contract 
or in tort, to Frescati and the USG. See In re Frescati Shipping 
Co., Ltd., 2011 WL 1436878 (E.D. Pa. 2011). In the meantime, the 
Athos I had been sold to scrap dealers (for $9.4 million) and 
dismantled by shipbreakers in Bangladesh.
On appeal, the Third Circuit, in an opinion by Circuit Judge 
Thomas L. Ambro, partially affirmed and partially reversed. See 
In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 718 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2013). 
Unlike Judge Fullam, Judge Ambro concluded that Frescati was a 
third-party beneficiary of the safe berth clause contained in the 
Star-CARCO voyage charter party. As such, he remanded for a 
determination of whether CARCO had violated the clause. He also 
directed Judge Fullam to consider whether CARCO had met its 
tort law “duty of care.” Although CARCO appealed Judge Ambro’s 
decision to the Supreme Court, it declined to hear the case. See 
CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 571 U.S. 
1197 (2014).
By now, Judge Fullam had retired, so the case was reassigned 
to District Judge Joel H. Slomsky, who held an additional 31 
days of hearings before finding that CARCO had 1) breached the 
safe berth clause and 2) failed to search for obstructions in the 
approach to its dock, thereby failing to fulfill its tort law duty of 
care. See In re Petition of Frescati Shipping Company, Ltd., 2016 
WL 4035994 (E.D. Pa. 2016). As a result, he awarded Frescati 
100 percent of its requested damages ($71.5 million).
Judge Slomsky also awarded damages to the USG, but reduced its 
claim by 50 percent due to the USG’s failure to discover the nearly 
seven-foot-long anchor. Judge Slomsky considered this fair given 
that the anchor had been resting in the Mantua Creek Anchorage, 
a government-controlled waterway better known as Federal 
Anchorage Number Nine, for likely decades. Accordingly, Judge 
Slomsky granted the USG $48.6 million.
On appeal, the Third Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge D. 
Brooks Smith, once again affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
See In re Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., 886 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2018). 
Although agreeing with most of Judge Slomsky’s decision, Chief 
Judge Smith held that CARCO had not violated any tort duty. This 
conclusion, however, had no effect on Frescati’s judgment: “Both 
theories of liability independently support the District Court’s 
judgment against CARCO. As a result, our decision to affirm the 
judgment based on CARCO’s contractual liability [i.e., the safe 
berth clause] means that we are not required to delve into the 
District Court’s tort analysis.”
Turning to the USG’s claim, Chief Judge Smith held that Judge 
Slomsky had erred by reducing it: “When, as here, the plaintiff 
seeks relief on a contract, the defendant may not resort to 
equitable recoupment as a means to assert a non-contractual 
claim, whether sounding in an equitable-balancing analysis, in 
tort, or otherwise.” Thus, Chief Judge Smith remanded the case 
to Judge Slomsky “for the purpose of recalculating [the USG’s] 
damages and prejudgment interest.”
Upon receiving Chief Judge Smith’s decision, CARCO filed a 
new petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. This time, 
the Court granted it. See CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati 
Shipping Co., Ltd., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019). On August 5, 2019, the 
Court granted CARCO’s motion to dispense with printing the joint 
appendix. See CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co., 
Ltd., 2019 WL 3538073 (U.S. 2019).
CASE ANALYSIS
Charter parties are agreements under which one party (the 
owner) leases its ship to another party (the charterer). The term 
charter party comes from the Latin phrase “charta partitia,” 
meaning “divided document.” Early charter parties were cut in half 
after signing, to allow each party to retain a copy.
There are three basic types of charter parties: time, voyage, and 
demise. In a time charter party, the owner agrees to lease the 
vessel for a set period (typically one year). In a voyage charter 
party, the owner agrees to lease the vessel for a specific voyage. 
Demise charter parties are used almost exclusively in the 
financing of new vessels. Such charter parties tend to run 20 to 
30 years, which is the normal working life of most vessels. (At the 
time of her scrapping in 2008, the Athos I was 25 years old.)
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In both time and voyage charters, the crew is provided by the 
owner. In demise charters, the crew is provided by the charterer. 
As a result, demise charters also are known as “bareboat” charters.
Most charter parties give the charterer the right to sub-charter 
(i.e., sublease) the vessel to third parties. Such third parties are 
known as sub-charterers. When a charter party “string” has a sub-
charterer, it is common to refer to the actual owner as the “head 
owner” and the charterer as the “disponent owner” to reflect its 
dual role.
Charter parties typically are arranged by independent brokers, 
although large companies often have their own in-house brokers. 
In rare instances, parties take the time to negotiate charter 
parties from the “ground up.” Such charter parties are known 
as “homegrown” charter parties. More commonly, parties use 
preprinted forms that require only a few key terms (such as the 
name of the ship, the dates of deployment, and the “hire,” or 
rental, price) to be filled in. If the parties wish to change any of 
the preprinted clauses, or add any special provisions, they do so by 
attaching amendments called “rider” clauses.
Star leased the Athos I to CARCO on a preprinted charter 
party known as “ASBATANKVOY.” Promulgated in 1977 by the 
Association of Ship Brokers and Agents (U.S.A.) Inc. (ASBA) 
(www.asba.org), a leading trade group, ASBATANKVOY now is the 
main form used to voyage charter oil tankers. Its popularity has 
been attributed to the balanced nature of its terms.
In pertinent part, the ASBATANKVOY safe berth clause (paragraph 
9) reads as follows:
The vessel shall load and discharge at any safe place or 
wharf, or alongside vessels or lighters reachable on her 
arrival, which shall be designated and procured by the 
Charterer, provided the Vessel can proceed thereto, lie at, 
and depart therefrom always safely afloat….
At page 7 of its brief urging the Supreme Court to hear CARCO’s 
appeal, ASBA pointedly declined to say whether it intended its 
handiwork to be read as a guarantee or merely a promise:
Amici express no view on the proper interpretation of 
the safe-berth clause here. When the party that actually 
causes a loss—in this case, the party that abandoned 
the anchor that later damaged the Athos I—cannot 
be identified, some innocent party must bear the risk. 
Because the charterer typically nominates the berth, it 
would be entirely rational to construe a safe berth clause 
to impose an absolute warranty, thus allocating the loss 
to the charterer when both parties are innocent. It would 
also be entirely rational to construe a safe-berth clause 
to impose only a due-diligence obligation. That would 
have the effect of imposing the loss on the owner if the 
charterer exercised reasonable care to discover any 
conditions that might render the berth unsafe for the 
vessel.
However the safe-berth clause is construed, it is 
important for both parties to have a clear understanding 
of the risks they bear when they enter into a transaction. 
Whether this Court affirms or reverses the judgment 
below, therefore, it should grant the petition and rule on 
the merits. Only if the result is clear in advance will the 
parties obtain the benefit of the risk allocation for which 
they bargained when they concluded the charterparty.
As noted above, the Second Circuit believes that a safe berth 
clause is a guarantee, while the Fifth Circuit considers it a mere 
promise. Over the years, academic commentators have lined up 
behind the Second Circuit, with one notable exception. In their 
oft-cited hornbook The Law of Admiralty (2d ed. 1975), Yale Law 
School Professors Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black Jr. argued 
that others had “gone too far” in characterizing a safe berth clause 
as a guarantee.
In addition to Orduna and Professors Gilmore and Black’s treatise, 
CARCO relies heavily on Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 F. 
Cas 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 601), aff’d, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 
(1873). In Orduna, the Fifth Circuit concluded that by adopting 
the district court’s opinion on the merits, the Supreme Court in 
Atkins signaled that safe port clauses (and, by extension, safe 
berth clauses) are promises and not warranties. However, even 
a cursory reading of the trial court’s decision in Atkins makes it 
clear that it stands only for the proposition that such clauses are 
waived in the absence of a timely protest:
If, then, the port named [i.e., Port Morant in Jamaica] 
was deemed an unsafe port…and so not within the 
privilege given by the charter, it was the duty of the 
master, as the sole representative of the owners, to have 
made known his objections at the time. Not having done 
so, he must be deemed to have waived the right to object, 
and, the condition having been waived, no action can 
now be maintained for the breach of it.
Atkins, 2 F. Cas. at 79.
SIGNIFICANCE
As ASBA notes, it matters little how the Supreme Court rules 
in this case (except, of course, to the parties, who have a lot of 
money riding on the outcome). If the Court follows the Second 
Circuit, then charterers will be strictly liable when they send ships 
to specific docks. Conversely, if it sides with the Fifth Circuit, then 
charterers will be only presumptively liable for their choices. In 
either event, the risk will be priced into the insurance premiums 
that owners and charterers pay, and any added costs will be passed 
on to their customers.
What is interesting about this case is that it is the fourth admiralty 
appeal the Court has heard in the past two years. Last term, 
of course, the Court decided three admiralty cases: The Dutra 
Group v. Batterton, 139 S. Ct. 2275 (2019) (punitive damages 
are unavailable in unseaworthiness cases) (previewed at 46:6 
at 26–29); Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton, 
139 S. Ct. 1881 (2019) (maritime law, rather than state law, 
regulates wages on the Outer Continental Shelf) (previewed at 
46:7 at 11–13); and Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. 
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Ct. 986 (2019) (seamen can sue manufacturers of marine parts 
that turn out to be dangerous) (previewed at 46:1 at 37– 40).
At one time, the Court’s docket was filled with admiralty disputes, 
but since the 1970s, it has shown little interest in the field. 
That the Court suddenly has become reengaged is particularly 
surprising when one considers that its docket, which used to 
average 150 cases per year, now routinely fails to reach 75 cases 
per year.
There is no ready explanation for the Court’s rediscovery of 
admiralty, and the recent surge may just be a fluke. On the other 
hand, this trend—if it is a trend—bears watching and may 
indicate that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Court to 
muster enough votes to take on more controversial matters. 
Robert M. Jarvis is a professor of law at Nova Southeastern 
University and a past editor of the Journal of Maritime Law 
and Commerce. He can be reached at jarvisb@nova.edu or 
954.873.9173. 
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